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Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that include policy rules for government spending,
lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor and capital income and on consumption expenditures
are fit to U.S. data under a variety of specifications of fiscal policy rules. We obtain several results.
First, the best fitting model allows a rich set of fiscal instruments to respond to stabilize debt. Second,
responses of aggregate variables to fiscal policy shocks under rich fiscal rules can vary considerably
from responses that allow only non-distortionary fiscal instruments to finance debt. Third, based on
estimated policy rules, transfers, capital tax rates, and government spending have historically responded
strongly to government debt, while labor taxes have responded more weakly. Fourth, all components
of the intertemporal condition linking debt to expected discounted surpluses---transfers, spending,
tax revenues, and discount factors---display instances where their expected movements are important
in establishing equilibrium. Fifth, debt-financed fiscal shocks trigger long lasting dynamics so that
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1. Introduction
Countries around the world combatted the recession and ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009 with
aggressive ﬁscal actions, both to stimulate demand with lower taxes and higher government
spending and to recapitalize banks through a variety of ﬁnancial “rescue” plans. In the
United States, the actions will raise the federal government ﬁscal deﬁcit to over 13 percent
of GDP in 2009. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce projects that these ﬁscal eﬀorts together
with the Obama administration’s ambitious federal budget will push federal debt held by the
public from 40 percent to 80 percent of GDP by 2019 [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009)].
Large run-ups in government debt have placed issues of ﬁscal ﬁnancing on policy makers’
front burners.
Rational expectations imply that economic agents’ beliefs about how debt innovations are
ﬁnanced by ﬁscal instruments play a crucial role in determining the resulting equilibrium and
evolution of endogenous variables. Even in a simple real business cycle model, the impulse
responses of economic variables following both ﬁscal policy and non-policy shocks depend
on what ﬁscal instrument ﬁnances debt [Leeper and Yang (2008)]. Understanding which
ﬁscal instruments have historically responded to debt and how quickly they have done so is
essential to accurately predict the impacts of ﬁscal policy.
Although many theoretical conclusions about the eﬀects of debt ﬁnancing exist, empirical
research that estimates how debt-ﬁnancing policies aﬀect the economy is scarce.
1 Except
for recent work by Chung and Leeper (2007), the identiﬁed VAR literature has ignored this
issue.
2 Estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models typically specify simple
Date: July 7, 2009. We thank Timothy Cogley, Shu-Chun S. Yang, and participants at a presentation
at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand for helpful comments. Department of Economics, Indiana University
and NBER, eleeper@indiana.edu; Department of Economics, Indiana University and Ball State University,
mplante@indiana.edu; Department of Economics, Indiana University, ntraum@indiana.edu.
1Theoretical examples include Ricardian equivalence [Barro (1974)], “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”
[Sargent and Wallace (1981)], and the ﬁscal theory of the price level [Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford
(1995), and Cochrane (1999)].
2Though see Favero and Giavazzi (2007) for a study that examines how including debt aﬀects inferences
from a VAR.
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ﬁscal policies in ways that are unlikely to capture the dynamic interactions present in data
[Kamps (2007), Ratto, Roeger, and in’t Veld (2006), and Coenen and Straub (2004)].
This paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate and evaluate a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium(DSGE) model that incorporates a rich description of ﬁscal policy, including non-
trivial debt dynamics. The paper’s core contribution lies in its detailed speciﬁcation of ﬁscal
policy instruments and dynamic adjustments of ﬁscal instruments in response to the level of
economic activity and to the state of government debt. We specify policy rules for capital,
labor, and consumption taxes, government spending, and lump-sum transfers. The rules
allow contemporaneous responses to output (“automatic stabilizers”) and dynamic responses
to government debt. By estimating a DSGE model that incorporates a rich description of
ﬁscal policy, we are able to estimate how government debt has been ﬁnanced historically and
examine how adjustments in each ﬁscal instrument has aﬀected the observed equilibrium.
Several recent papers employ Bayesian techniques to estimate ﬁscal policy rules and to
understand the economic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy [Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009), Kamps
(2007), Ratto, Roeger, and in’t Veld (2006), and Coenen and Straub (2004)]. However, most
of this literature has focused on modeling exogenous ﬁscal policy, where deﬁcits are ﬁnanced
by lump-sum transfer adjustments. A series of papers demonstrates that in real business
cycle-style models it can be seriously misleading to set aside debt dynamics by ignoring
distortionary ﬁscal ﬁnancing [for example, Baxter and King (1993), Sims (1998), and Leeper
and Yang (2008)].
We estimate four versions of the model: all four ﬁscal instruments—government spend-
ing, lump-sum transfers, and capital and labor taxes—adjust to stabilize debt; only capital
and labor taxes adjust; only government spending adjusts; only lump-sum transfers adjust.
Model speciﬁcation tests imply that U.S. time series strongly prefer the more complex model
in which all four instruments stabilize debt.
The paper reports present-value multipliers for each of the ﬁscal instruments and shows
that they can diﬀer dramatically across the various model speciﬁcations. Because inferences
about policy eﬀects depend strongly on the underlying ﬁscal rules, the ﬁnding underscores
the importance of modeling ﬁscal ﬁnancing dynamics. Moreover, these dynamics can be quite
long lasting—its takes 20 to 25 years to restore intertemporal ﬁscal balance after shocks to
capital taxes, consumption taxes, or transfers; it can take 40 years or more to restore balance
after labor tax or government spending shocks. Because of these low-frequency dynamics,
short-run and long-run multipliers can diﬀer markedly.
With estimates of the model’s “deep parameters” in hand, it is possible to conduct coun-
terfactual experiments that alter policy rules, holding private parameters ﬁxed at their esti-
mated values. We address three counterfactual questions: (1) How do the impacts of ﬁscalDYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 3
shocks change if future policies respond to debt more or less gradually than they have his-
torically? (2) How do ﬁscal multipliers change when, instead of the historical sources of
ﬁnancing for debt, we imagine that only future capital taxes adjust? (3) What are the long-
run consequences of enhanced “automatic stabilizers?” Answers to questions like these can
help guide policy choices.
This paper complements a large-scale global modeling eﬀort underway at the International
Monetary Fund to estimate DSGE models that incorporate ﬁscal policy rules that allow for
both distortionary and non-distortionary sources of ﬁscal ﬁnancing by focusing on simpler
models that are more easily interpretable and emphasizing fresh implications that spring
from explicit modeling of government debt dynamics.
3
Our results are subject to an important caveat: they do not include the interactions
between monetary and ﬁscal policies that tend to arise in practice, and certainly occurred
in response to the recent recession. Recent work ﬁnds that ﬁscal multipliers can change
dramatically when monetary policy is passive, failing to satisfy the Taylor principle, or when
the central bank’s interest rate instrument is at or near the zero lower bound [for example,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009),
Davig and Leeper (2009), or Eggertsson (2009)]. On the other hand, by abstracting from
nominal considerations, this paper puts empirical ﬂesh on the multipliers that Uhlig (2009)
calculates in a calibrated model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the estimated model, our as-
sumptions regarding ﬁscal policies, and the technique used to solve the model. Section 3
outlines the techniques we use to estimate the model, and our assumptions regarding prior
distributions. Section 4 summarizes the estimation results while section 5 reports some
counterfactual exercises. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Models
The model economy is a neoclassical growth model extended to include intertemporal in-
vestment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization, and external habit formation. The
economy consists of a representative household, a representative ﬁrm, and the government.
There are nine transitory shocks in the economy, denoted by ut’s, including two preference
shocks, an investment-speciﬁc shock, neutral technology shock, and shocks to ﬁscal instru-
ments.
2.1. Households. The representative household derives utility from consumption, ct, rela-
tive to a habit stock. We assume that the habit stock is given by a fraction of aggregate
3Some example of papers ﬂowing from the IMF eﬀort include Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Botman, Laxton,
Muir, and Romanov (2006), and Kumhof and Laxton (2008a,b).DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 4
consumption from the previous period hCt−1 where h ∈ [0,1]. The household derives disu-
tility from hours worked, lt. In addition, there is a general preference shock, ub
t, that aﬀects
the household’s intertemporal substitution and a preference shock speciﬁc to labor supply
ul
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The household’s ﬂow budget constraint is given by
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tvtkt−1 + Rt−1bt−1 + zt (3)
Total income and wealth consists of labor income, capital income, lump-sum transfers from
the government, zt, and interest bearing government bonds. These assets can be used for
consumption, investment in physical capital it, and for purchasing more government bonds.
Capital income is given by the return on the eﬀective amount of capital services supplied
to ﬁrms in period t, vtkt−1, where vt measures capacity utilization in period t. One-period
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The law of motion for capital is given by
















is a cost of adjustment incurred if the household varies its investment level from the level
in the previous period. The function s(·) has the following properties at steady state:
s(1) = s0(1) = 0 and s00(1) > 0. In addition, the adjustment cost is subject to a speciﬁc
eﬃciency shock ui
t which follows the AR(1) process
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t ∼ N(0,1) (5)
Owners of physical capital can control the intensity with which the capital stock is utilized.
We assume that increasing the intensity of capital utilization entails a cost in the form of a
faster rate of depreciation. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008), we adopt a quadratic
form for the function δ:





The household maximizes utility subject to its budget constraint, (3), and the law of
motion for capital, characterized by (4) and (6).DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 5
2.1.1. Firms. The representative ﬁrm rents capital and labor from the household to maxi-
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t . From the solution to the ﬁrm’s problem,



















t Ct = Rt−1Bt−1 + Gt + Zt (10)
where Gt is government expenditure and Xt represents the aggregate level of any variable x.
Fiscal policy follows rules that embed three features. First, there may be some “automatic
stabilizer” component to movements in ﬁscal variables. This is modeled as a contempora-
neous response to deviations of output from steady state. Second, all instruments except
consumption taxes are permitted to respond to the state of government debt. Third, since
ﬁscal policy makers often consider changes in tax rates jointly, we allow shocks aﬀecting one
tax rate to also aﬀect other tax rates contemporaneously. In terms of log deviations from
steady state, the policy rules are:































































where hats denote log-deviations of variables and each of the ￿’s is distributed N(0,1).
Consumption taxes are taken follow an exogenous process because U.S. federal consump-
tion taxes are mostly excise taxes on speciﬁc goods (gasoline, tobacco, etc.) and are used
mainly for special funds. Thus, they do not adjust to changes in current output or govern-
ment debt.
The other ﬁscal instruments follow rules that allow response to the cyclical position of the
economy (ϕi ≥ 0 for i = {g,k,l,z}) and to changes in the level of government debt (γi ≥ 0
for i = {g,k,l,z}). To capture the persistent nature of exogenous changes in instruments,
we allow the shocks to be serially correlated (ρi ∈ [0,1] for i = {g,k,l,z}). In addition weDYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 6
augment the ﬁscal rules with i.i.d. error terms (￿i
t for i = {g,k,l,z}) to capture unexpected
changes in policy. Parameters φij for i,j = {k,l,c} controls how muchunpredictedmovement
in one tax rate is due to an exogenous shock to another tax rate.
2.2. Market Equilibrium and Model Solution. The ﬁnal goods market is in equilibrium
if aggregate production equals aggregate demand for consumption and investment by the
household and government
Yt = Ct + It + Gt (16)
The capital rental market and labor market are in equilibrium if both the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions for the household and the ﬁrm are satisﬁed. In addition, any equilibrium must satisfy
the transversality conditions for debt and capital accumulation. Note that equilibrium im-
plies xt = Xt for any variable x.
Equilibrium conditions and their log-linearizations around the deterministic steady state
are given in appendix A. The log-linearized model is solved using Sims’s (2001) gensys
algorithm. The solution is of the form:
xt = G(Θ)xt−1 + M(Θ)￿t, ￿t ∼ N(0,I) (17)
where Θ denotes the vector of structural parameters to be estimated and xt denotes the
vector of model variables at time t.
3. Estimation
We report results from estimates of four models that diﬀer in which ﬁscal instruments
are permitted to respond to debt: four ﬁscal instruments—government spending, lump-sum
transfers, and capital and labor taxes—adjust; only capital and labor taxes adjust; only
government spending adjusts; only lump-sum transfers adjust.
Models are estimated with U.S. quarterly data from 1960Q1 to 2008Q1. We use nine
time series: real consumption, real investment, hours worked, real government debt, real
government spending, real capital tax revenues, real labor tax revenues, real consumption
tax revenues, and real government transfers. Appendix B describes the data construction.
We detrend the logarithm of each variable with a linear trend. Let yt denote the vector
of observables and deﬁne the following measurement equation relating observables to model
variables
yt = Hxt (18)
Using this mapping between observables and model variables, we estimate the model using
Bayesian methods. First, we use Chris Sims’s optimization routine csminwel to maximize the
log posterior function, which combines the priors and the likelihood of the data. Then we useDYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 7
the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to sample from the posterior distribution.
4
When performing the optimization routine, we initialize the posterior mode search with
parameter values drawn at random from the prior densities. We perform several—at least
50—searches for the mode from diﬀerent starting values to determine if more than one mode
exists. In all the models, the searches for the posterior mode almost always converged to the
same parameter values and likelihood value.5 After running the MH algorithm, we perform
diagnostics to ensure convergence of the MCMC chain.6
3.1. Priors and Calibrated Values. Table 1 presents the values assigned to the calibrated
parameters (which can be viewed as very strict priors). These values were kept ﬁxed because
our data set is demeaned and cannot pin down many steady state values in the estimation
procedure. The discount factor, β, is set to equal 0.99, which implies an annual steady state
interest rate of 4 percent. We set α equal to 0.3, which implies a labor share of 70 percent.
We assume that the annual steady state depreciation rate is 10 percent, which implies that
δ0 equals 0.025. We calibrate the parameter δ1 to ensure that capacity utilization, v, equals
unity in the steady state. In addition, the steady state tax rates and the ratios of government
spending and debt to output are set equal to the mean values of our data set.
Tables 2 and 3 shows the prior distributions for the remaining parameters, and ﬁgures
1 and 2 plot the probability density functions that correspond to these priors. We assume
that the parameters are independent a priori. The priors are similar to those commonly
used in the literature [see Smets and Wouters (2003), Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009),
and An and Schorfheide (2007) for examples]. The means were set at values that correspond
with estimates of other studies in the literature and the standard errors were set so that
the domain covers a reasonable range of parameter values, including values estimated by
previous studies.
For the preference parameters, a Gamma distribution is assumed for the coeﬃcients of risk
aversion γ and of Frisch elasticity κ, with means of 1.75 and 2, respectively, and a standard
deviation for both parameters equal to 0.5, so that both prior masses are concentrated on
values higher than a logarithmic speciﬁcation. The habit coeﬃcient h, whose mean is set at
4A sample of 5,000,000 draws was created with the ﬁrst 250,000 used as a burn-in period and every 200th
thinned. The posterior mode and the inverse Hessian at the posterior mode resulting from the optimization
procedure were used to deﬁne the transition probability function. A step size of 0.3 resulted in acceptance
rates between 34 percent and 38 percent.
5The few exceptions were simply cases where the numerical optimization procedure failed to converge to
any value. In addition, since we initialize the MH algorithm with the posterior mode and Hessian, we checked
the gradient and the conditioning number of the Hessian at the mode and plotted slices of the likelihood
around the mode. These details appear in an estimation appendix available upon request.
6Diagnostics include trace plots, verifying the chain is well mixed (i.e. has low serial correlations in sample
draws), and performing Geweke’s (2005, pp. 149-150) Separated Partial Means tests. All results appear in
an estimation appendix available upon request.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 8
0.5, is distributed according to a Beta distribution with a standard deviation of 0.2. The
capital utilization adjustment coeﬃcient δ2, whose means is set at 0.7, is distributed accord-
ing to a Gamma distributions with standard deviations of 0.5. This gives the prior density
the most mass at values that are less than one, which is consistent with the estimates of
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). Beta distributions are chosen for the autoregressive coeﬃ-
cients (all ρj’s) as well, with means and standard deviations set at 0.7 and 0.2, respectively.
The standard deviations of the innovations are assumed to be distributed as Inverse Gamma.
The investment adjustment coeﬃcient, s00, has a Gamma distribution with a mean of 5 and
standard deviation equal to 0.25.7
The priors for the ﬁscal parameters were chosen to be fairly diﬀuse and cover a reasonably
large range of parameter values. The ﬁscal responses to government debt (the γi’s) are
assumed to have a Gamma distribution with a mean of 0.4 and standard deviation of 0.2 (so
that they will range approximately between 0 and 1.25). The ﬁscal instruments’ elasticities
with respect to output (the ϕi’s) are assumed to have Gamma distributions. The mean of
the government spending elasticity is 0.07 and its standard deviation is 0.05 while the mean
of the transfer elasticity is 0.2 and its standard deviation is 0.1. These values ensure the
domains cover the range of values estimated by past research [see Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare, and van den Noord (1995), and Yang (2005) for
examples]. Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) estimates of the elasticity of tax revenue with
respect to output inform the priors over ϕk and ϕl. They report that a 1 percent increase
in output leads to a 2.08 percent increase in tax revenue based on 1947:1-1997:4 U.S. data,
which implies roughly a 1 percent increase in the average tax rate. Since we incorporate
Social Security taxes in our labor tax revenue data, the labor tax rate elasticity is expected
to be a value below this average because Social Security taxes are capped and are regressive.
Thus, we set the labor tax rate elasticity to have a mean and standard deviation of 0.5 and
0.25, and the capital tax rate elasticity to have a mean and standard deviation of 1 and 0.3.
The parameter measuring the co-movement between the capital and labor tax rate shocks
(φkl) is assumed to have a Normal distribution with a mean of 0.25 and a standard deviation
of 0.1. Yang (2005) estimates φkl to be 0.26. The parameters measuring the co-movement
betweenthe capital and consumption tax rate shocks and betweenthe labor and consumption
tax rate shocks (φkc and φlc) are assumed to have a Normal distribution with a mean of 0.05
and a standard deviation of 0.1. To our knowledge, there is no past research estimating φkc
7Prior to estimation, we performed an analysis similar to An and Schorfheide (2007) to investigate the
identiﬁability of parameters. We randomly drew several sets of parameter values from the prior distributions,
simulated data, and investigated the ability to recover the underlying parameters using our estimation
strategy. Results (available from the authors upon request) suggest that the Frisch elasticity parameter, κ
is not well identiﬁed. In addition, γ, κ, and s00 seem to be correlated. Our tight prior on s00 is a reﬂection of
its weak identiﬁability.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 9
and φlc. Given that consumption taxes in our U.S. data set are mainly excise taxes used for
special funds, we do not expect these values to be large.
4. Estimation Results
Tables 2-3 report the means and 5 and 95 percentiles of the posterior distribution for
each of the four models estimated. With the exception of the comovement terms between
consumption and labor/capital taxes, all parameters are estimated to be away from zero.
Interestingly, the non-policy parameter estimates are about the same across the various
model speciﬁcations and are similar to estimates in the literature. With the exception of the
investment speciﬁc shock and preference shock, all the persistent shocks are estimated to
have an autoregressive parameter which is higher than the mean of 0.7 assumed in the prior
distribution. Our estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/γ) is less than
one, and the external habit stock is estimated to be about 50 percent of past consumption.8
The estimate of the Frisch elasticity κ is around 2.
Turning to the policy parameter estimates, the results indicate that several distortionary
ﬁscal instruments have played an important role in ﬁnancing debt innovations. Although the
response of lump-sum transfers to debt innovations is the highest, the responses of capital
tax rates and government spending are also important. In contrast, it appears that labor
taxes have not responded strongly to debt. The results also show that capital tax rates have
had a highly procyclical response to the level of aggregate output, while labor tax rates are
less responsive. Transfers have responded to the level of aggregate output, but the estimate
here is slightly smaller than that used in previous studies; Perotti (2004), for example, uses
a value of −0.15 in his VAR estimation strategy. Finally, we ﬁnd that exogenous changes to
capital and labor tax rates aﬀect the two rates simultaneously (φkl ∈ [0.1,.25]), suggesting
that typical tax legislation tends to change both tax rates. In contrast, exogenous changes
to consumption tax rates do not aﬀect the capital or labor tax rates.
4.1. Impulse Responses. Figures 3-7 plot the impulse responses following a temporary
1 percent exogenous increase in each ﬁscal instrument. The solid line is generated with
the mean estimates of the posterior distribution, while the dashed lines give the 5th and
95th percentiles based on the posterior distributions. Each row compares the responses of
a variable across the various estimated models, while each column reports responses within
a model. The last column shows the ﬁscal impacts of the best ﬁtting model where all ﬁscal
instruments respond to debt.
8The results suggest the posterior of habit is quite similar to its prior. However, we estimated a diﬀerent
version of the model where we changed the prior on habit formation to be a beta distribution with a mean
of 0.7 and standard deviation of 0.2, and in this case, the posterior estimates of the habit stock were almost
identical to the ones reported here (estimates in an additional estimation appendix available upon request).DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 10
Figure 3 illustrates the responses of output, consumption, investment, and government
debt following a 1 percent shock to government spending. As is standard in a RBC-style
model, an increase in government spending reduces wealth, increasing work eﬀort and output
on impact. Government spending crowds out investment and its negative wealth eﬀect leads
consumption to decline. However, these eﬀects can be quickly reversed depending on how the
government debt is ﬁnanced. For instance, when only capital and labor taxes are expected
to increase in the future to support the expansion in debt, the return on future capital and
labor is lowered (second column). Households cut back on investment and hours worked,
causing output to fall below its initial steady state level within two years of the initial
ﬁscal expansion; output remains well below its steady state level for over 10 years. A similar
result also occurs in Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009), which also allows only distortionary
taxes to respond to debt innovations in a new Keynesian model. In contrast, when lump-
sum transfers or a combination of all the ﬁscal instruments are allowed to respond to debt
innovations, output remains above its steady state level throughout its transition period
(ﬁrst and fourth columns).9
Impacts of a 1 percent increase in the capital tax rate appear in ﬁgure 4. Standard
theory suggests that when capital taxes increase, investment, labor, and output decrease
immediately while consumption rises as agents sacriﬁce investment for consumption [see
Baxter and King (1993), Braun (1994) and Leeper and Yang (2008)]. In the estimated
models, the responses of variables can diﬀer dramatically from these conventional eﬀects.
For instance, for all four models considered, consumption decreases on impact following a
capital tax increase. This reduction occurs because exogenous changes to capital and labor
taxes are correlated; when capital taxes increase, labor taxes increase as well, which causes
households to work and consume less.
The path of investment also diﬀers qualitatively depending on which ﬁscal instruments
respond to debt. If capital and labor taxes are expected to decrease in order to oﬀset
the reduction in debt, investment rises above its steady state level and remains positive
throughout the transition path (second column). The increase in investment and hours
worked (not pictured), increase output above its steady state level. In this case the capital
tax rate (not pictured) actually drops below its original steady state levelafter approximately
three years before it returns to its steady state. The resulting increase in tax revenues is
more than enough to oﬀset the change in debt, allowing the capital tax rate to fall and
further spur investment and output.
Figure 5 reports the eﬀects of a 1 percent increase in the labor tax rate. In all cases, the
responses of output and consumption are conventional: higher labor taxes lead households
9This result is, in part, model speciﬁc and might not hold if transfers were distortionary. However, the
results suggest that which combination of ﬁscal instruments responds to debt is central for the paths of
aggregate variables. Even under alternative model speciﬁcations, this general feature will hold.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 11
to reduce their labor supply, reducing disposable income and consumption. Reduction in la-
bor supply lowers output. On impact, one might expect investment to decline as well, since
the return to capital falls as households decrease their labor supply. However, the impulse
responses demonstrate that this prediction depends crucially on which ﬁscal instruments ad-
just to debt innovations. In fact, all three models that allow distortionary ﬁscal instruments
to adjust to debt do not rule out the possibility of investment increasing on impact (since
a positive response is within the probability bands of the impulse responses). When taxes
adjust to debt, investment increases with the mean response peaking at 1 percent above
steady state (second column). In this case, capital taxes actually decrease on impact. This
decrease is brought about by the capital tax rate response to output, which declines on im-
pact. Capital taxes then continue to be consistent with declining debt, increasing the return
to investment.
Eﬀects of higher consumption taxes, shown in ﬁgure 6, are similar. They tend to lower
consumption, but raise investment. When distorting instruments stabilize debt, output rises
within a couple of years. Output falls when transfers alone adjust to debt.
Figure 7 illustrates the responses to a 1 percent increase in lump-sum transfers. Because
lump-sum transfers are non-distortionary in our model, the responses of output, consump-
tion, and investment are driven entirely by agents’ expectations of how the resulting increase
in debt will be ﬁnanced. For instance, if government spending decreases to ﬁnance the higher
debt, investment falls for about 5 years before rising (third column); when taxes are expected
to rise, investment falls markedly over the entire forecast horizon (second column).
4.2. Posterior Odds Comparisons. The results of the previous section suggest that as-
sumptions about which ﬁscal instruments adjust to debt innovations play critical roles in
determining the transition paths of variables in response to ﬁscal shocks. Which scenarios
are favored by the data? We use Bayes factors to evaluate the relative model ﬁt, calculating
the log-marginal data density using Geweke’s (1999) modiﬁed harmonic mean estimator, as
outlined in An and Schorfheide (2007). As explained by Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramirez (2004), the Bayes factor is the ratio of the probabilities from having observed the
data given each model, as reﬂected by the marginal data densities. The Bayes factor is a
measure of the evidence provided by the data in favor of one model over another.
Table 4 displays the log-marginal data density and Bayes factor for the four models already
discussed plus a ﬁfth model in which only transfers respond to debt and the countercyclical
parts of policy, as well as the correlation among shocks to tax rates, are shut down (labeled
Addendum in the table). The results suggest that the models with a response of transfers
to changes in debt (γz > 0) ﬁt better than the models without the transfer-debt response.10
Richer models that include more complex ﬁscal adjustment perform better than the simpler
10In the present model, transfers are lump-sum. This ﬁnding could change if transfers were not neutral.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 12
models, even though the Bayes factor discriminates against complex models with more pa-
rameters. This can be seen by comparing the ﬁt of the model where transfers adjust with
and without the output responses and tax comovement terms, the last model whose Bayes
factor is listed in the table.
The log marginal likelihood diﬀerence between the model where only lump-sum transfers
adjust to debt and the model that allows all ﬁscal variables to respond to debt is 7. This
number can be interpreted as reporting that to prefer the model in which only transfers
adjust, one would need to have a prior probability for the transfers-only model that is 1,097
(= exp[7]) times larger than our prior over the model in which all instruments adjust. The
common theoretical practice of ignoring debt ﬁnancing by assuming that lump-sum transfers
clear the government budget is not favored by the data. The results also suggest that we
would need a prior probability for the model in which only taxes adjust that is 148 (= exp[5])
times larger than our prior over the model in which only government spending adjusts. In
fact, the model allowing only taxes to adjust to debt seems to be the least favored by the
data. Similar studies that estimate ﬁscal policy rules allow either only lump-sum transfers or
only distortionary taxes to adjust to debt [for example, Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009),
Kamps (2007), Ratto, Roeger, and in’t Veld (2006), and Coenen and Straub (2004)]. The
comparisons here suggest that the data prefer speciﬁcations that allow lump-sum transfers,
distortionary taxes, and government spending to adjust.
Fit deteriorates sharply when only transfers adjust but countercyclical aspects of policy
behavior and correlation among tax shocks are eliminated (Addendum in table 4). This
speciﬁcation essentially treats government spending and tax rates as exogenous processes, a
practice that is common when generating theoretical predictions about ﬁscal impacts.
4.3. Present-Value Multipliers. Quantitative eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks are frequently sum-
marized by ﬁscal multipliers for output, consumption, and investment. Following Mountford
and Uhlig (2009), we report present-value multipliers, which are preferred over impact mul-
tipliers because they embody the full dynamics associated with ﬁscal disturbances and they
properly discount macroeconomic eﬀects in the future. The present value of additional out-
put over a k-period horizon that is generated by a change in the present value of government




















Tables 5 and 6 report the results. Note that the present-value multiplier at k = 1 is equal
to the impact multiplier at period one; impact multipliers are widely reported in empirical
studies [for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009)].DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 13
When all ﬁscal instruments respond to debt, as in table 5, present-value multipliers tend
to be modest; no multiplier exceeds 1. Government spending multipliers for output are
substantially lower that those obtained in loosely identiﬁed empirical studies, which fre-
quently are around 1.5 [Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Monacelli and Perotti (2008), Romer
and Bernstein (2009)], but are comparable to those from real business cycle models [Uh-
lig (2009)].11 Spending multipliers for consumption are uniformly negative, a result that is
standard in real models, but has recently received much attention [Gali, Lopez-Salido, and
Valles (2007), Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007), Monacelli and Perotti (2008), Davig
and Leeper (2009)]. In contrast to Uhlig’s (2009) calibrated results, we ﬁnd that in the best
ﬁtting model there is no tendency for tax multipliers to be larger than spending multipliers,
except that in our estimates, higher transfers reduce output.
Present-value multipliers change dramatically when only capital and labor taxes react to
stabilize debt, as table 6 reports. First, it is commonplace for long-run multipliers to have
a diﬀerent sign from short-run multipliers [see also Judd (1985), Sims (1998), Leeper and
Yang (2008), Uhlig (2009)]. Higher government spending stimulates output for a couple of
years, but as taxes rise, output falls and the long-run present-value multiplier is sharply
negative. Lower capital taxes only weakly raise output in the short run; after a couple of
years output reverses and is below steady state until eventually returning back to steady
state. Because there is a brief time (25 quarters in the table) where output has already
increased above steady state and capital tax revenue are still above steady state, multiplier
is positive. Eventually, though, capital taxes must adjust to the lower level of debt and drop
below steady state. At this point, capital tax revenues drop below steady state and the very
long run the present value multiplier is strongly negative. Second, as the output multiplier
of −3.70 demonstrates (second panel of table 6), capital tax multipliers can be very large
indeed in the long run.
12
4.4. Present-Value Financing. We turn now to the forward-looking aspect of government
ﬁnance. We calculate the present-value decompositions of debt to calculate what combination
of adjustments in the expected paths of ﬁscal policy instruments and discount rates ratio-
nalize the observed value of government debt. We also examine how adjustments depend on
the nature of the ﬁscal policy shock. In log-linearized form, the government’s present-value
11As noted in the introduction, the introduction of nominal considerations, including nominal rigidities,
and monetary policy behavior can change the size of multiplier dramatically [Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009), Davig and Leeper (2009), or Eggertsson (2009)].
12Variance decompositions suggest that ﬁscal policy shocks contribute little to the cyclical variability of
aggregate non-policy variables, but ﬁscal variables are aﬀected by all policy and non-policy shocks, reﬂecting
the inﬂuence of each ﬁscal instruments’ response to output and debt. Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009)
obtain similar results.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 14
relation is









































where the unsubscripted variables denote steady state values and ˆ T k
t+j, ˆ T l
t+j, and ˆ T c
t+j denote
total revenues due to capital, labor, and consumption taxes. This expression decomposes
ﬂuctuations in real debt into expected changes in the components of net-of-interest surpluses,
at constant discount rates, and expected changes in real discount rates.
The present-value decompositions for the best ﬁtting model, in which all ﬁscal instruments
adjust to stabilize debt, are listed in table 7. The table shows each of the present-value
components in (19) following a shock to each of the exogenous processes when the shock is
calibrated to raise or lower debt by one unit of the ﬁnal good. Diﬀerent shocks are ﬁnanced
very diﬀerently in present-value terms. When the components have the same sign as the
change in debt, the component is expected to move to support the change in debt; when the
signs diﬀer, the component is expected to move against stabilizing debt.
For the capital and labor tax shocks, both the discount rate and the present value of sur-
pluses move to support debt. With a capital tax shock, most of the work is done by changes
in the present value of surpluses, whereas for labor taxes, the discount rate contributes
more. In contrast, following a shock to government spending, the present value of surpluses
alone moves to support debt, with taxes, spending, and transfers changes oﬀsetting each
other. The discount rate, on the other hand, resists present-value balance. Similar results
hold for a technology, general preference, or labor preference shock. Following a shock to
transfers, most of the present-value balancing is done by surpluses. While the same is true
for consumption tax shocks, the discount rate tends to move against present-value balance.
Interestingly, an investment-speciﬁc shock generates movements in the discount rate that
support debt, while the surplus resists present-value balance.
For each type of shock, taxes, spending, and transfers experience sizeable but oﬀsetting
movements in present value. Interestingly, none of the ﬁscal policy instruments consistently
move to support the innovation in debt in all cases. All instruments can move to support or
oﬀset debt innovations, depending on the shock.
Figure 8 displays the present-value funding horizons of government debt innovations for
various ﬁscal shocks using the best ﬁtting model in which all ﬁscal instruments respond
to debt. The ﬁgure can answer the question, “What fraction on a 1-unit innovation in
government debt in quarter t, due to each of the ﬁve ﬁscal shocks, is ﬁnanced by period
t+K, where K is determined by the quarters on the x-axis?” The ﬁgure, therefore, reportsDYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 15


















where S is the steady state net-of-interest surplus and ˆ St+j denotes percentage deviations of
the surplus from steady state.
As the ﬁgure makes clear, it takes many years for ﬁscal adjustments to restore present-
value balance. Debt innovations induced by consumption taxes, capital taxes, or transfers
are fully ﬁnanced after 20 to 25 years. Government spending and labor tax shocks, however,
can take 40 or more years to be fully ﬁnanced. Over shorter horizons up to two years, serial
correlation in the shocked policy instrument worsens the ﬁscal stance in the sense that the
sum in (20), truncated at K ≤ 8, moves farther from the value of ˆ Bt.
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis: Subsample Estimates. This section examinesposterior mode
estimates for various sub-samples in order to investigate the stability of the full sample es-
timates. The ﬁrst subsample, 1976Q1-2008Q1, eliminates the 1973-75 recession from the
sample as well as the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 passed to provide a one-time tax rebate
to stimulate the economy. The second subsample, 1989Q1-2008Q1, ignores the initial eﬀects
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which changed the structure of income and corporate in-
come tax rates. Finally, the last subsample, 1993Q1-2008Q1, starts after the recession of
1990Q3-91Q1 and begins with the implementation of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993. Table 8 compares the modes of the posterior distributions over these periods.
The estimates of the structural parameters vary slightly across the subsamples. The
results are consistent with Smets and Wouters (2007) in that habit formation seems to
increase in the later subsamples and the capacity utilization parameter increases over the
1989Q1-2008Q1 subsample.13 The most signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the three subsamples
are the coeﬃcients for the ﬁscal instruments’ responses to debt. Labor tax rates responded
more strongly to debt, while transfers responded less strongly over the subsamples. The
results suggest that in the last ﬁfteen years capital taxes have had the strongest response to
debt.
5. Counterfactual Fiscal Experiments
Given estimates of the model’s “deep parameters,” we can consider counterfactual ques-
tions that ask how ﬁscal impacts might change under policies that are diﬀerent from history.
13Because the subsample dates considered in Smets and Wouters (2007) diﬀer slightly from those consid-
ered here and Smets and Wouters use a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of capacity utilization, comparisons between
our results and theirs should be made with caution.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 16
All three sets of counterfactuals use the private parameters from the best ﬁtting model in
which all instruments respond to debt and then intervene in various ways on the policy rules.
5.1. Speed of Fiscal Adjustments. We consider alternative scenarios in which we scale
all ﬁscal adjustment parameters up or down to increase or decrease the speed of adjustment
of future policies to government debt. Fiscal policy rules become






























ˆ Zt = −ϕZ ˆ Yt − µγZ ˆ Bt−1 + u
z
t. (25)
where µ ∈ (0.05,3.0) is the scaling parameter. µ = 0.05 is the slowest speed of adjust-
ment consistent with equilibrium. Setting µ = 1 (vertical lines in the ﬁgure) reproduces the
multipliers for the posterior mean. When µ < 1, ﬁscal adjustments are slower and debt accu-
mulates more rapidly; µ > 1 accelerates ﬁscal adjustments, ensuring less debt accumulation.
Figure 9 compares present-value multipliers for output for each of the ﬁscal shocks—
government spending, capital taxes, labor taxes, and transfers—under alternative sets of the
ﬁscal adjustment parameters. Present-value multipliers are expressed as a function of the
scaling parameter µ at various horizons: at impact (solid lines, horizon = 1) and at quarters
5 (dotted-dashed lines), 10 (dashed lines), and 25 (dotted lines).
Government spending multipliers are smaller at every horizon when ﬁscal adjustment ac-
celerates, a pattern that also applies to labor tax multipliers (two left-hand panels). When
capital tax shocks are ﬁnanced more rapidly the multiplier decline, but only at shorter hori-
zons. Medium-run present-value multipliers (25-quarter horizon) display a non-monotonic
pattern at very slow speeds of adjustment, before actually rising with the speed of adjustment
once µ > 0.25.
5.2. Alternative Financing Schemes. The patterns that emerge from ﬁgure 9, in which
all instruments adjust, can change in important ways when only a single instrument takes
on the burden of stabilizing debt. The second counterfactual exercise varies both the source
of ﬁscal ﬁnancing—restricting it to adjustment by only a single instrument—and the speed
of adjustment. We also eliminate the correlation among tax shocks estimated in the best
ﬁtting model.
Figure 10 reports present-value multipliers for output from changes in government spend-
ing, labor tax rates, and capital tax rates. The ﬁgure extends the forecast horizon to 50 years
in order to highlight the diﬀerences between short-to-medium-run multipliers and long-run
multipliers. The counterfactual allows capital taxes, labor taxes, or government spending toDYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 17
adjust one at a time. Slower adjustment (solid lines) scales the parameter on debt in the
rule for the adjusting instrument by setting µ = 0.5, while faster adjustment (dashed lines)
scales the parameter by setting µ = 2.0 in the policy rules (21)-(23).
When future capital taxes alone stabilize debt, slower adjustment raises government spend-
ing multipliers at shorter horizons, but at the cost of smaller multipliers over longer horizons
(top left panel). Regardless of the speed of adjustment, when capital taxes back debt that is
issued to ﬁnance government spending, the present-value multiplier rapidly turns negative
and can easily exceed −1.0. When labor taxes adjust, on the other hand, there appears to
be no tradeoﬀ: slower adjustment raises the government spending multiplier over the entire
50-year horizon.
If government spending adjusts to debt following an increase in either capital or labor tax
rates, interesting non-monotonicities set in (second and third panels on left). In the short
run, slower adjustment enhances multipliers, but over longer horizons, slower adjustment
reduces the present-value multipliers for taxes. In the case of labor tax shocks, multipliers
change sign, with the sign change occurring much sooner when debt stabilization is rapid.
Labor tax multipliers change sign very quickly when capital taxes adjust to debt, with
higher labor taxes lowering output only brieﬂy (second panel on right). In the medium and
long runs, higher labor taxes raise output substantially because capital taxes are persistently
lower to satisfy the government’s present-value relation. Finally, when labor taxes stabilize
debt following a shock to capital taxes, the present-value multiplier is uniformly larger when
labor taxes adjust more slowly (bottom right panel).
5.3. Enhanced “Automatic Stabilizers”. The ﬁnal counterfactual exercise examines the
consequences of increasing or decreasing the “automatic stabilizer”aspect of the ﬁscal rules—
the ϕ coeﬃcients on contemporaneous output in policy rules (11), (12), (13), and (15).
Speciﬁcally, we ask how the government spending present-value multiplierfor output changes
when capital taxes alone adjust to stabilize debt, as in the top left panel of ﬁgure 10, and
the degree of “automatic” responsiveness of ﬁscal variables to output ﬂuctuations changes.
Figure 11 reports the present-value multipliers for four diﬀerent settings of the ϕ coef-
ﬁcients: no automatic response (dashed line); estimated responses (solid line); twice the
estimated responses (dotted line); three times the estimated responses (dotted-dashed line).
Stronger “automatic stabilizers,” which may help to reduce the short-run ﬂuctuations in-
duced by various shocks, impose a long-run cost. In this example, higher government spend-
ing initially raises output, which under the estimated policies, raises capital and labor taxes
and lowers transfers.
But in this scenario, higher expected taxes on capital quickly reverse the initial stimulus
to output. Naturally, “automatic stabilizers” are symmetric: when output falls, the declinesDYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 18
in tax revenues and increases in government expenditures are ampliﬁed, reducing future
surpluses still more. Capital taxes, therefore, must rise more sharply to stabilize debt.
Stronger countercyclical responses exacerbate the decline in future surpluses and require
more dramatic tax hikes, which drive output still lower. This counterfactual shows that
short-run countercyclical ﬁscal behavior can make the long-run multiplier for government
spending dramatically diﬀerent.
6. Concluding Remarks
Even a casual observer of the ﬁscal policy process acknowledges that it is immensely
complex. The estimates from the model with the best ﬁt to data make this point precise:
shocks that raise government debt outstanding trigger dynamic reactions in government
spending, capital and labor taxes, and transfer payments that can take many decades to
play out fully. The practice of examining the macroeconomic consequences of ﬁscal changes
without also studying the resulting debt dynamics and subsequent ﬁscal adjustments is
sharply at odds with time series data.
Three central messages emerge from the estimates:
(1) Assumptions about which ﬁscal instruments may adjust to stabilize debt are very
important for the ultimate impacts of changes in ﬁscal policy.
(2) The speed at which government debt is stabilized following a ﬁscal disturbance plays
a critical role in determining the eﬀects of the shock on the macro economy.
(3) Because debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal changes trigger very long-lived dynamics, even in com-
pletely conventional models, short-run impacts can diﬀer sharply from long-run ef-
fects, even being of diﬀerent signs.
Although the dynamic interactions among policy variables in the estimated models are
complex, understanding these complexities is just the ﬁrst step in understanding how ﬁscal
policy aﬀects the economy. Introducing non-neutral transfer payments [Blanchard (1985),
Weil (1987), Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009)], a distinction between productive and
unproductive government spending [Aschauer (1989), Baxter and King (1993)], monetary
policy behavior [Leeper and Sims (1994), Kim (2000)], and the possibility of ﬁscal foresight
[Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009)], is a short list of further complications worthy of modeling
attention.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 19
Appendix A. Derivations of Model Equations
This appendix derives of the log-linearized model used for estimation.
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Yt = Ct + Gt + It (A.6)




































Equations (A.1)-(A.12) along with the ﬁscal policy rules, equations (11)-(15) in the text and
the shock processes deﬁned in the text, equations (1), (2), (5), and (8), deﬁne a competitive
equilibrium.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 20
A.2. Steady State.













Y , K, C, and L can be solved from the following set of equations:
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Y ˆ Yt = C ˆ Ct + G ˆ Gt + Iˆ It (A.18)
















ˆ Bt−1+G ˆ Gt+Z ˆ Zt (A.20)
ˆ Yt = ˆ u
a
t + αˆ vt + α ˆ Kt−1 + (1 − α)ˆ Lt (A.21)
These equations, along with the exogenous processes given by equations (1), (2), (5), (8),
and (11)-(15) in the text, comprise the set of equations used to solve the model using Sims’s
(2001) algorithm.
Appendix B. Data Construction
Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ NIPA. All
data in levels are nominal values. Nominal data are converted to real values by dividing by
the GDP deﬂator.
P: The GDP deﬂator for personal consumption expenditures (line 2 in Table 1.1.4)
M: The St. Louis adjusted monetary base. Quarterly rates are computed as averages
of monthly rates.
Consumption Tax Revenues. The consumption tax revenues, T c, include excise taxes
and customs duties (lines 5 and 6 in NIPA Table 3.2).




C − T c − T c
s
where C is personal consumption expenditure on nondurable goods (table 1.1.5 line 4) and
on services (table 1.1.5 line 5) and T c
s is state and local sales taxes (table 3.3 line 12).
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Capital and Labor Tax Rates. Following Jones (2002), ﬁrst the average personal




W + PRI/2 + CI
where IT is personal current tax revenues (table 3.2 line 3), W is wage and salary accruals
(table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietors’ income (table 1.12 line 3), and CI is capital income.
Capital income is deﬁned as rental income (table 1.12 line 12), corporate proﬁts (table 1.12
line 13), interest income (table 1.12 line 18), and PRI/2.
The average labor income tax rate is computed as:
τ
l =
τp(W + PRI/2) + CSI
EC + PRI/2
14Quarterly data for sales taxes is not available until 1958. From 1947 to 1957, the annual values are used
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where CSI is contributions for government social insurance (table 3.2 line 11) and EC is com-






where CT is taxes on corporate income (table 3.2 line 7) and PT is property taxes (table 3.3
line 8).15
Capital and Labor Tax Revenues. The capital and labor tax revenues are constructed
by multiplying the average tax rate and tax base.
Government Expenditure. Government expenditure, G, is deﬁned as government con-
sumption expenditure (table 3.2 line 20), government gross investment (table 3.2 line 41),
and government net purchases of non-produced assets (table 3.2 line 43), minus government
consumption of ﬁxed capital (table 3.2 line 44).
Transfers. Transfers, TR, are deﬁned as net current transfers, net capital transfers, and
subsidies (table 3.2 line 31), minus the tax residual. Net current transfers are deﬁned as
current transfer payments (table 3.2 line 21) minus current transfer receipts (table 3.2 line
15). Net capital transfers are deﬁned as capital transfer payments (table 3.2 line 42) minus
capital transfer receipts (table 3.2 line 38). The tax residual is deﬁned as current tax receipts
(table 3.2 line 2), contributions for government social insurance (table 3.2 line 11), income
receipts on assets (table 3.2 line 12), and the current surplus of government enterprises (table
3.2 line 18), minus total tax revenue, T (consumption, labor, and capital tax revenues).
Government Debt. Government debt, B, is deﬁned as:
Bt = NB − Seigniorage + Bt−1
where Seigniorage is deﬁned as Mt − Mt−1 and NB is net borrowing. Net borrowing is
computed using the NIPA deﬁcits concept, speciﬁcally as G + INT + TR − T, where INT
is interest payments (table 3.2 line 28).16
Hours Worked. Hours worked is constructed from the following variables:
H: Nonfarm Business, All Persons, Average Weekly Hours Duration : index, 1992 =
100, Seasonally Adjusted. (from U.S. Department of Labor, PRS85006023).
15Although τk and τl are computed using quarterly data, quarterly data for property taxes is not available
until 1958. For 1947 to 1957, the annual values are used for all four quarters.
161947:1 debt is not calculated with this deﬁnition, but is set at the value of the Cox and Hirschhorn
(1983) market value of debt for 1947:1. The Cox-Hirschhorn debt series is not used in general since the series
is not consistent with NIPA’s net borrowing deﬁnition. However, the correlation between the debt series
in this paper and the Cox-Hirschhorn debt series, which is maintained and updated at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, is approximately 0.998DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 23
Emp: Civilian Employment: Sixteen Years & Over, measured in thousands, Seasonally
Adjusted. (from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CE16OV).
Turned into an index where 1992:3 = 100.




Deﬁnitions of Observable Variables. The observable variable X is deﬁned by making








Popindex: index of Pop, constructed so that 1992:3 = 1.
Pop: Civiliannoninstitutional population, ages 16 years and over, Seasonally Adjusted.
Number in thousands (from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), LNS10000000.
and x = consumption, investment, hours worked, government spending, labor tax revenues,










Table 1. Calibrated Parameters for Estimated ModelDYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 25
Parameter Prior Distribution Mean (5 & 95 Percentiles) of Posterior Distribution
Density Mean St. Dev. All Adjust Spending Adjust Tax Adjust Transfer Adjust
Risk aversion γ G 1.75 0.50 2.7 2.68 2.67 2.68
(2.1, 3.4) (2.1, 3.3) (2.1, 3.3) (2.1, 3.3)
Frisch elasticity κ G 2.00 0.50 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.8
(1.4, 2.6) (1.4, 2.6) (1.4, 2.6) (1.3, 2.5)
Habit formation h B 0.50 0.20 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.49
(0.4, 0.6) (0.4, 0.6) (0.4, 0.6) (0.4, 0.59)
Investment adj. cost s
00 G 5.00 0.25 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
(5.1, 5.9) (5.1, 5.9) (5.2, 5.9) (5.1, 5.9)
capital util. cost δ2 G 0.70 0.50 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.28
(0.2, 0.42) (0.2, 0.40) (0.2, 0.42) (0.2, 0.42)
Gov. spend debt coeﬀ. γg G 0.40 0.20 0.23 0.24 - -
(0.15, 0.31) (0.17, 0.32) - -
Cap. tax debt coeﬀ. γtk G 0.40 0.20 0.39 - 0.39 -
(0.28, 0.51) - (0.27, 0.5) -
Labor tax debt coeﬀ. γtl G 0.40 0.20 0.049 - 0.052 -
(0.019, 0.09) - (0.022, 0.092) -
Transfer debt coeﬀ. γz G 0.40 0.20 0.5 - - 0.5
(0.41, 0.59) - - (0.4, 0.6)
Cap. tax Y coeﬀ. ϕtk G 1.00 0.30 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.4
(1.2, 2.1) (0.99, 1.8) (1.2, 2.0) (0.98, 1.8)
Labor tax Y coeﬀ. ϕtl G 0.50 0.25 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.38
(0.16, 0.61) (0.16, 0.6) (0.14, 0.56) (0.16, 0.65)
Gov. spend Y coeﬀ. ϕg G 0.07 0.05 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.033
(0.0064, 0.084) (0.0063, 0.082) (0.0059, 0.077) (0.0059, 0.084)
Transfer Y coeﬀ. ϕz G 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13
(0.049, 0.24) (0.043, 0.21) (0.042, 0.2) (0.048, 0.25)
Cap./Labor co-term φkl N 0.25 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.15
(0.14, 0.24) (0.11, 0.2) (0.14, 0.23) (0.11, 0.2)
Cap./Cons. co-term φkc N 0.05 0.10 0.024 0.047 0.025 0.049
(-0.025, 0.074) (-0.0014, 0.1) (-0.023, 0.073) (-0.0035, 0.1)
Labor/Cons. co-term φlc N 0.05 0.10 -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 -0.026
(-0.077, 0.018) (-0.073, 0.02) (-0.075, 0.018) (-0.076, 0.024)
Table 2. Selected prior and posterior distributions for the various models estimated.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 26
Parameter Prior Distribution Mean (5 & 95 Percentiles) of Posterior Distribution
Density Mean St. Dev. All Adjust Spending Adjust Tax Adjust Transfer Adjust
Tech. AR coeﬀ. ρa B 0.70 0.20 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
(0.94, 0.98) (0.94, 0.98) (0.94, 0.98) (0.94, 0.98)
Pref. AR coeﬀ. ρb B 0.70 0.20 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
(0.62, 0.69) (0.62, 0.69) (0.62, 0.69) (0.62, 0.70)
Labor AR coeﬀ. ρl B 0.70 0.20 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
(0.97, 0.99) (0.97, 0.99) (0.97, 0.99) (0.96, 0.99)
Inv. AR coeﬀ. ρi B 0.70 0.20 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.58
(0.47, 0.64) (0.45, 0.62) (0.44, 0.61) (0.49, 0.66)
Gov. spend AR coeﬀ. ρg B 0.70 0.20 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96
(0.95, 0.99) (0.95, 0.99) (0.94, 0.99) (0.93, 0.98)
Cap. tax AR coeﬀ. ρtk B 0.70 0.20 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.91
(0.9, 0.97) (0.88, 0.95) (0.9, 0.97) (0.87, 0.93)
Labor tax AR coeﬀ. ρtl B 0.70 0.20 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
(0.95, 0.99) (0.95, 0.99) (0.95, 0.99) (0.94, 0.99)
Cons. tax AR coeﬀ. ρtc B 0.70 0.20 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
(0.89, 0.97) (0.89, 0.97) (0.9, 0.97) (0.9, 0.97)
Transfer AR coeﬀ. ρz B 0.70 0.20 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.95
(0.91, 0.98) (0.94, 0.99) (0.94, 0.99) (0.91, 0.98)
Tech std σa IG
1 1 4 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62
(0.58, 0.68) (0.58, 0.68) (0.58, 0.68) (0.57, 0.68)
Pref. std σb IG
1 1 4 7 7 6.9 7
(6.4, 7.7) (6.4, 7.7) (6.3, 7.6) (6.4, 7.8)
Labor std σl IG
1 1 4 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8
(2.3, 3.5) (2.3, 3.5) (2.3, 3.5) (2.2, 3.4)
Inv. std σi IG
1 1 4 6.4 6.2 6.2 6.6
(5.7, 7.2) (5.6, 7) (5.5, 6.9) (5.8, 7.5)
Gov. spend std σg IG
1 1 4 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
(2.8, 3.3) (2.8, 3.3) (2.9, 3.4) (2.9, 3.4)
Cap. tax std σtk IG
1 1 4 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.6
(4.1, 4.7) (4.3, 4.9) (4.1, 4.7) (4.2, 5)
Labor tax std σtl IG
1 1 4 3 3 3 3
(2.8, 3.2) (2.8, 3.2) (2.8, 3.2) (2.8, 3.3)
Cons. tax std σtc IG
1 1 4 4 4 4 4
(3.8, 4.4) (3.8, 4.3) (3.8, 4.4) (3.7, 4.4)
Transfer std σz IG
1 1 4 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.4
(3.1, 3.7) (3.6, 4.2) (3.6, 4.2) (3.1, 3.7)
1: The parameters for the Inverse Gamma distribution correspond to s and ν where f(x|s,ν) = νsΓ−1(s)x−s−1 exp
−ν
x .
Table 3. Selected prior and posterior distributions for the various models estimated.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 27
Model Speciﬁcation Log Marginal Bayes Factor Relative to
Data Density Model Where All Adjust
All ﬁscal instruments adjust −68 1.0
Only government spending adjusts −97 exp[29]
Only taxes adjust −102 exp[34]
Only transfers adjust −75 exp[7]
Addendum
Only transfers adjust, −86 exp[18]
no output response or tax comovements
Table 4. Model Fit ComparisonsDYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 28
Government Spending Present-Value Multipliers
Variable 1 quarter 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
PV(∆Y )
PV(∆G) 0.64 0.43 0.33 0.20 0.03
PV(∆C)
PV(∆G) −0.26 −0.34 −0.35 −0.40 −0.60
PV(∆I)
PV(∆G) −0.10 −0.23 −0.32 −0.40 −0.36
Capital Tax Present-Value Multipliers
Variable 1 quarter 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
PV(∆Y )
PV(∆T k) −0.18 −0.26 −0.33 −0.50 −0.72
PV(∆C)
PV(∆T k) −0.076 −0.11 −0.11 −0.19 −0.47
PV(∆I)
PV(∆T k) −0.11 −0.30 −0.47 −0.64 −0.60
Labor Tax Present-Value Multipliers
Variable 1 quarter 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
PV(∆Y )
PV(∆T l) −0.19 −0.19 −0.19 −0.19 −0.21
PV(∆C)
PV(∆T l) −0.17 −0.26 −0.29 −0.33 -0.37
PV(∆I)
PV(∆T l) −0.02 −0.03 −0.04 −0.05 −0.04
Transfers Present-Value Multipliers
Variable 1 quarter 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
PV(∆Y )
PV(∆Z) −0.02 −0.16 −0.28 −0.46 −0.59
PV(∆C)
PV(∆Z) 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.12
PV(∆I)
PV(∆Z) −0.03 −0.09 −0.15 −0.23 −0.23
Table 5. Present-value ﬁscal multipliers when all ﬁscal instruments respond
to debt. Mean estimates of posterior draws from best ﬁting model in which
all ﬁscal instruments—government spending, capital taxes, labor taxes, and
transfers—adjust to stabilize debt.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 29
Government Spending Present-Value Multipliers
Variable 1 quarter 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
PV(∆Y )
PV(∆G) 0.59 0.32 0.14 −0.21 −0.99
PV(∆C)
PV(∆G) −0.24 −0.28 −0.27 −0.33 −0.89
PV(∆I)
PV(∆G) −0.17 −0.40 −0.59 −0.88 −1.10
Capital Tax Present-Value Multipliers
Variable 1 quarter 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
PV(∆Y )
PV(∆T k) −0.14 −0.20 −0.18 0.42 −3.70
PV(∆C)
PV(∆T k) −0.10 −0.14 −0.18 −0.52 −0.83
PV(∆I)
PV(∆T k) −0.04 −0.06 0.01 0.94 −2.90
Labor Tax Present-Value Multipliers
Variable 1 quarter 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
PV(∆Y )
PV(∆T l) −0.14 −0.12 −0.04 0.22 0.92
PV(∆C)
PV(∆T l) −0.19 −0.30 −0.34 −0.36 0.06
PV(∆I)
PV(∆T l) 0.05 0.17 0.31 0.58 0.87
Transfers Present-Value Multipliers
Variable 1 quarter 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters ∞
PV(∆Y )
PV(∆Z) −0.07 −0.19 −0.33 −0.64 −1.40
PV(∆C)
PV(∆Z) 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.11 −0.38
PV(∆I)
PV(∆Z) −0.11 −0.30 −0.46 −0.75 −0.98
Table 6. Present-value ﬁscal multipliers when only capital and labor taxes
respond to debt. Mean estimates of posterior draws from model in which only













G −9.68 14.39 17.04 2.26 −24.55 −2.30 −4.95 −2.70 3.08
T k 10.14 2.02 −19.61 −3.85 7.54 5.90 −4.41 −1.77 3.12
T l 19.18 −11.39 −35.52 −5.96 1.85 2.01 22.98 −2.74 0.25
T c 2.10 −0.49 −4.27 −0.26 −0.42 −0.01 −0.36 13.65 0.02
Z −26.42 39.9 46.43 6.11 17.23 −6.49 −13.97 −7.58 −5.49
R 3.68 −43.43 −3.07 2.70 −0.65 −0.11 −0.29 0.14 0.02
Surplus −4.68 44.43 4.07 −1.70 1.65 −0.89 −0.71 −1.14 0.98
∆B −1 +1 +1 +1 +1 −1 −1 −1 +1
Table 7. Present-value ﬁnancing using the mean estimates of posterior draws
from the model where all ﬁscal instruments respond to debt. Shocks normal-
ized to raise or lower debt by 1 unit. Rows for G, T k, T l, T c, and Z sum to
Surplus; rows for R and Surplus sum to ∆B.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 31
1976Q1-2008Q1 1989Q1-2008Q1 1993Q1-2008Q1
Mode SD Mode SD Mode SD
γ 2.3 0.46 2.4 0.47 2.5 0.57
κ 1.8 0.4 2.1 0.45 1.9 0.43
h 0.52 0.079 0.5 0.095 0.69 0.085
s00 5.4 0.26 5.3 0.25 5.2 0.25
δ2 0.4 0.13 0.5 0.23 0.35 0.17
ρa 0.96 0.02 0.9 0.033 0.85 0.056
ρc 0.65 0.033 0.63 0.041 0.52 0.052
ρl 0.98 0.015 0.98 0.02 0.97 0.024
ρi 0.69 0.063 0.85 0.048 0.73 0.078
ρg 0.97 0.02 0.98 0.021 0.96 0.036
ρτk 0.91 0.033 0.88 0.06 0.8 0.085
ρτl 0.93 0.033 0.94 0.037 0.91 0.055
ρτc 0.90 0.038 0.9 0.053 0.73 0.1
ρz 0.87 0.046 0.83 0.07 0.85 0.072
γg 0.12 0.056 0.58 0.13 0.38 0.16
γτk 0.21 0.1 0.38 0.18 0.91 0.25
γτl 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.09 0.18 0.1
γz 0.18 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.24 0.1
ϕτk 1.4 0.059 1.2 0.32 0.9 0.26
ϕτl 0.2 0.11 0.3 0.16 0.4 0.22
ϕg 0.035 0.034 0.03 0.033 0.035 0.038
ϕz 0.13 0.075 0.15 0.084 0.13 0.073
σa 0.52 0.034 0.55 0.048 0.56 0.053
σc 6.7 0.54 7.7 0.71 7.1 0.76
σl 2.5 0.39 2.2 0.33 3.1 0.57
σi 6.3 0.8 7.2 1.8 4.4 0.87
σg 2.8 0.17 2.7 0.21 3.2 0.29
στk 4.7 0.29 4.5 0.36 4.3 0.39
στl 2.5 0.16 2.5 0.21 2.89 0.26
στc 4.3 0.27 3.4 0.28 2.8 0.26
σz 2.8 0.18 3.1 0.26 2.4 0.21
φkl 0.12 0.035 0.15 0.043 0.22 0.051
φkc 0.0074 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05
φlc 0.052 0.036 0.026 0.051 0.035 0.055












































































































Figure 1. Prior (dashed black) vs. posterior (solid blue) distributions. Pos-
terior distributions are from the model where all ﬁscal instruments adjust to









































































































Figure 2. Prior (dashed black) vs. posterior (solid blue) distributions. Pos-
terior distributions are from the model where all ﬁscal instruments adjust to





















































































































Figure 3. Estimated impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in government
spending shock. The solid line is the mean impulse response; the dashed lines


















































































































Figure 4. Estimated impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in the capital
tax rate. The solid line is the mean impulse response; the dashed lines are the





















































































































Figure 5. Estimated impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in the labor
tax rate. The solid line is the mean impulse response; the dashed lines are the



















































































































Figure 6. Estimated impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in the con-
sumption tax rate. The solid line is the mean impulse response; the dashed
lines are the 5 percent and 95 percent posterior intervals. X-axis measures






























































































































Figure 7. Estimated impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in transfers.
The solid line is the mean impulse response; the dashed lines are the 5 percent
and 95 percent posterior intervals. X-axis measures years.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 39




















Figure 8. Government debt funding horizons for ﬁscal shocks using the mean
estimates of posterior draws from the model where all ﬁscal instruments re-
spond to debt. The x-axis units are quarters.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 40
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Figure 9. Present-value ﬁscal multipliers for output at various horizons, as
a function of the speed of adjustment of future ﬁscal variables for shocks to
government spending, capital taxes, labor taxes, and transfers. Vertical line at
µ = 1 is best ﬁtting parameters; µ < 1 reduces speed at which debt is retired;
µ > 1 increases speed at which debt is retired. X-axis measures quarters.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 41
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Figure 10. Present-value ﬁscal multipliers for output as a function of the
speed of adjustment of future ﬁscal variables and which single ﬁscal variable
responds to debt. Uses parameters from best ﬁtting model where all ﬁscal
instruments adjust to debt, but changes ﬁscal rules so that only a single in-
strument adjusts and tax shocks are uncorrelated. Slower adjustment (solid
lines) scales the relevant ﬁscal parameter by 0.5; faster adjustment (dashed
lines) scales relevant ﬁscal parameter by 2.0. X-axis measures quarters.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 42













Figure 11. Present-value government spending multipliers for output as a
function of the degree of “automatic” responsiveness of ﬁscal variables to con-
temporaneous output ﬂuctuations when only capital taxes adjust to stabilize
debt. Uses parameters from best ﬁtting model where all ﬁscal instruments ad-
just to debt. No automatic response (dashed line); estimated responses (solid
line); twice the estimated responses (dotted line); three times the estimated
responses (dotted-dashed line). X-axis measures quarters.DYNAMICS OF FISCAL FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 43
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